Court Document for TAJH LEE, AS THE PUTATIVE PERSONAL REPRESENTATITIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JAYDEN LEE vs. MARLON TRANSPORTATION, LLC November 09, 2023 (2024)

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Ruling

SALAIZ vs LOANDEPOT.COM, LLC

Aug 26, 2024 |CVSW2307833

MOTION FOR PRO HAC VICE AS TOSALAIZ VSCVSW2307833 ARTHUR B SALAIZ, HEATHER DLOANDEPOT.COM, LLCJOHNSON-SALAIZTentative Ruling:GRANTED

Ruling

SHERMANN KEITH GUIANG VS NEIL PIO FERNANDES, ET AL.

Case Number: 22STCV29932 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: 29 Guiang v. Fernandes 22STCV29932 Plaintiffs Motion to Continue Tentative The motion is denied. Background Three related cases arise out of a vehicle accident on September 22, 2020 on SR-91 Westbound Freeway, just east of Atlantic Avenue in Long Beach, California. On September 14, 2022, Plaintiff Shermann Keith Guiang (Plaintiff) filed the complaint in this action (Case No. 22STCV29932) asserting causes of action for motor vehicle negligence and general negligence against Defendants Neil Pio Fernandes, David Robert Vaugh, and Does 1 through 50. On September 16, 2022, Plaintiff amended the complaint to name Karen Tanedo as Doe 1. On October 26, 2022, David Robert Vaughn (Vaughn) and Karen Tanedo filed an answer. On November 3, 2022, Neil Pio Fernandes (Fernandes) filed an answer and a cross-complaint against Vaughn and Raul Carranza Valencia. On December 16, 2022, Vaughn filed an answer to Fernandess cross-complaint. Two other cases have been filed relating to the same accident: Case No. 22STCV30845 (filed by Plaintiff Raul Carranza against Guiang, Vaughn, Karen Tanedo, and Fernandes) and Case No. 22STCV30912 (filed by Fernandes and Andres Contreras Arrellano against Guiang, Vaughn, and Karen Tanedo). The cases were related on May 2, 2024. The cases are not consolidated at this time. On August 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to continue this matter. No opposition has been filed. This case is set for trial on October 14, 2024. Legal Standard Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8), provides that the court has the power to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conform to law and justice. The power to determine when a continuance should be granted is within the discretion of the trial court. (Color-Vue, Inc. v. Abrams (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1603.) A trial court has wide latitude in the matter of calendar control including the granting or denying of continuances. (Park Motors, Inc. v. Cozens (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 12, 18.) To ensure the prompt disposition of civil cases, the dates assigned for trial are firm. All parties and their counsel must regard the date set for trial as certain. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(a).) Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c).) The court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance. (Ibid.) Circ*mstances that may support a finding of good cause include: (1) The unavailability of an essential lay or expert witness because of death, illness, or other excusable circ*mstances; (2) The unavailability of a party because of death, illness, or other excusable circ*mstances; (3) The unavailability of trial counsel because of death, illness, or other excusable circ*mstances; (4) The substitution of trial counsel, but only where there is an affirmative showing that the substitution is required in the interests of justice; (5) The addition of a new party if: (A) The new party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; or (B) The other parties have not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial in regard to the new party's involvement in the case; (6) A party's excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts; or (7) A significant, unanticipated change in the status of the case as a result of which the case is not ready for trial. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c).) In ruling on a motion or application for continuance, the court must consider all the facts and circ*mstances that are relevant to the determination. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(d).) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(d) sets forth a non-exhaustive list of factors that the court may consider: (1) The proximity of the trial date; (2) Whether there was any previous continuance, extension of time, or delay of trial due to any party; (3) The length of the continuance requested; (4) The availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance; (5) The prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance; (6) If the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, the reasons for that status and whether the need for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay; (7) The court's calendar and the impact of granting a continuance on other pending trials; (8) Whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial; (9) Whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance; (10) Whether the interests of justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing conditions on the continuance; and (11) Any other fact or circ*mstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(d).) Discussion Plaintiff seeks a continuance of trial from October 14, 2024, to January 13, 2025. Plaintiffs counsel states that he took over this matter on June 28, 2024, and discovered no discovery has been served against Defendant Fernandes and no depositions were taken by the previous handling attorneys. (Bassil Decl., ¶¶ 2, 3.) Counsel also states that other discovery has not been completed, including the deposition of the police officer who wrote the accident reports. (Id., ¶ 4.) Counsel lastly, states he was unsuccessful in obtaining a stipulation to continue from Defendants counsel. (Id., ¶ 5.) Good cause for continuance can include the following: (1) The unavailability of an essential lay or expert witness because of death, illness, or other excusable circ*mstances; (2) The unavailability of a party because of death, illness, or other excusable circ*mstances; (3) The unavailability of trial counsel because of death, illness, or other excusable circ*mstances; (4) The substitution of trial counsel, but only where there is an affirmative showing that the substitution is required in the interests of justice; (5) The addition of a new party if: (A) The new party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; or (B) The other parties have not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial in regard to the new party's involvement in the case; (6) A party's excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts; or (7) A significant, unanticipated change in the status of the case as a result of which the case is not ready for trial. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c).) None of the above reasons fit Plaintiffs request. Plaintiff filed his complaint almost two years ago, and Defendant Fernandes filed an answer in November 2022. More than 21 months have passed with Plaintiff failing to seek discovery from Defendant Fernandes. There is no evidence that Plaintiff has acted diligently or reasonably in litigating this case. The voluntary change of the handling attorney within a law firm described by counsel does not establish good cause for a trial continuance. Plaintiff has failed to show good cause to continue trial. The motion is denied. Conclusion The Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion to continue. Moving Party is ORDERED to give notice.

Ruling

SALCEDO vs PITA STREET, INC

Aug 29, 2024 |CVRI2103980

MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANTNISHANT PATEL TO RESPOND TOSALCEDO VS PITA STREET, PLAINTIFF'S DEMAND FORCVRI2103980INC PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS;AND AN AWARD OF MONETARYSANCTIONS BY MERILYN SALCEDOTentative Ruling:GRANT

Ruling

Terrie Donadio vs State of California, Department of Transportation, et al.

Aug 28, 2024 |23CV-03678

23CV-03678 Terrie Donadio v. State of California Department of TransportationCase Management ConferenceAppearance required. Remote appearances are permitted. Parties who wish to appearremotely must contact the clerk of the court at (209) 725-4111 to arrange for a remoteappearance. Appear to address the status of the case.

Ruling

NATALYA VYDRUG VS NELLI KHLEBNIKOVA, ET AL.

Aug 27, 2024 |23STCV15058

Case Number: 23STCV15058 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Dept: 52 Tentative Ruling: Defendants Nelli Khlebnikova and Karolina Khlebnikovas Motion to Compel Plaintiff Natalya Vydrug to Appear at Her Deposition and to Produce Documents Defendants Nelli Khlebnikova and Karolina Khlebnikova move to compel plaintiff Natalya Vydrug to testify at and produce documents at her deposition. Timeliness of Motion Plaintiff argues the motion is untimely because defendants did not make it within 60 days of plaintiffs objection to the notice of deposition. Plaintiff relies on Code of Civil Procedure 2025.480. Subdivision (a) of that section provides, If a deponent fails to answer any question or to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing under the deponents control that is specified in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production. Subdivision (b) provides, This motion shall be made no later than 60 days after the completion of the record of the deposition. That section does not apply. Section 2025.480 applies when, after a deposition, the party who took the deposition seeks answers or documents the deponent did not provide. (See Weinstein v. Blumberg (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 316, 318 [motion made after party testified at deposition].) Here, the correct statute is section 2025.450, subdivision (a), which provides for moving to compel a deposition when, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action & without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination. Defendants served a deposition notice, and plaintiff failed to appear for examination. There was no completion of the record of the deposition (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (b)) because there was no deposition. Plaintiffs reliance on In re Marriage of Moore (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1275 is misplaced. There, the court discussed section 2025.480(b) when a party moved to compel responses after receiving objections to a deposition subpoenas for production of business records on nonparties. (Id. at p. 1282.) The court applied the rule that the record of the deposition was complete, and the 60-day clock began to run, on the deposition subpoenas date of production when the nonparty deponents asserted objections and declined to produce responsive documents. (Id. at p. 1287.) That rule does not apply when a party to the action fails to appear for oral examination pursuant to a notice of deposition. Other Arguments Plaintiff makes a myriad of other technical or procedural arguments. For example, plaintiff filed an opposition addressing the motion at length, but argues defendants failed to give proper notice of the hearing date or failed to include a proper proof of service. Any such defects are irrelevant. It is well settled that the appearance of a party at the hearing of a motion and his or her opposition to the motion on its merits is a waiver of any defects or irregularities in the notice of motion. & This rule applies even when no notice was given at all. (Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697.) Similarly, plaintiff argues defendants did not provide a declaration stating they contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2).) Plaintiff argues the declaration instead only says defendants counsel contacted plaintiffs counsel to confirm that plaintiff would not appear. (Opp., p. 6.) The statute does not require any particular words or asking a specific question. When meeting and conferring, though some effort is required in all instances [citation], the level of effort that is reasonable is different in different circ*mstances, and may vary with the prospects for success. These are considerations entrusted to the trial courts discretion and judgment, with due regard for all relevant circ*mstance. (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 432433.) In these circ*mstances, the parties had a minimal prospect of resolving the dispute informally. Defendants email about plaintiffs deposition was a sufficient attempt to inquire about the nonappearance. Plaintiff also argues defendants failed to meet and confer as required under Code of Civil Procedure 2025.480, subdivision (b). As discussed above, that is the wrong statute. Furthermore, plaintiff argues the motion does not comply with Code of Civil Procedure 2025.450, subdivision (b)(1), which provides, The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice. Plaintiff contends that showing requires a declaration presenting evidence. Not necessarily. The statute provides, The motion shall set forth specific facts& . (Ibid., italics added.) In contrast, the following subparagraph requires, The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (Id., subd. (b)(2).) The Legislature knows the difference between a motion and a declaration. If the Legislature had intended to require a declaration rather than the motion itself setting forth specific facts, it could have easily said so. (Busker v. Wabtec Corp. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1147, 282 Cal.Rptr.3d 333, 343-344.) Cases construing identical statutory text state that to set forth specific facts showing good cause requires an explanation, not necessarily admissible evidence. A proponent of discovery must explain how the evidence sought is relevant to a disputed material fact. (Sosa v. CashCall, Inc. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 42, 47, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1)); accord Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98 [the party who seeks to compel production has met his burden of showing good cause simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance, interpreting former Code Civ. Proc., § 2031, subd. (m)].) The notice of plaintiffs deposition requests 28 categories of documents. On their face, each request is discoverable. Moreover, plaintiff never objected to the document requests. Assuming plaintiffs correspondence constituted serving an objection under Code of Civil Procedure 2025.410, substantively, plaintiff objected only that the initial deposition notice was not signed and that they did not agree to the dates selected. (Forberg Decl. Ex. B; Carr Decl., Ex. F.) Neither is a valid objection under Code of Civil Procedure 2025.410. Section 2025.220 specifies requirements for a notice of deposition in detail, including specifying a minimum font size. It does not require any signature. As for the date, mutually agreeing to a date may be a matter of professional courtesy, but the Civil Discovery Act does not require it. An oral deposition shall be scheduled for a date at least 10 days after service of the deposition notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.270, subd. (a).) The service of a deposition notice under Section 2025.240 is effective to require any deponent who is a party to the action& to attend and to testify, as well as to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing for inspection and copying. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.280, subd. (a).) The court rejects these and all other arguments in the opposition. All objections to the notice of plaintiffs deposition are overruled. Defendants are entitled to an order compelling plaintiffs deposition and requiring her to produce all documents responsive to request Nos. 1-28. Sanctions Defendants move for $3,000 in sanctions against plaintiff and her counsel, D. Joshua Staub and James Carr, jointly and severally. When the court grants a motion to compel deposition, it must impose monetary sanctions unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (g)(1).) Moreover, opposing, unsuccessfully and without substantial justification, a motion to compel discovery is a misuse of the discovery process subject to monetary sanctions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (h).) Plaintiff and her counsel did not act with substantial justification, both in failing to appear for the deposition and in unsuccessfully opposing this motion. Sanctions are just under the circ*mstances. Defendants reasonably incurred $3,000 in expenses bringing this motion. Improper Service of Opposition As defendants reply brief notes, plaintiff served the opposition by mail. Doing so was improper for two reasons. First, Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b) provides, [A]ll papers opposing a motion and all reply papers shall be served by personal delivery, facsimile transmission, express mail, or other means consistent with Sections 1010, 1011, 1012, and 1013, and reasonably calculated to ensure delivery to the other party or parties not later than the close of the next business day after the time the opposing papers or reply papers, as applicable, are filed. Regular mail is not reasonably calculated to ensure delivery by the close of the next business day. Second, Code of Civil Procedure 1010.6, subdivision (b)(4) provides, A person represented by counsel shall, upon the request of any person who has appeared in an action or proceeding and who provides an electronic service address, electronically serve the requesting person with any notice or document that may be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or facsimile transmission. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (b)(4).) In multiple emails, defendants counsel has written, Due to continued remote working condition, transmit all further communications and service of pleadings via email to tony@forberglaw.com. (Forberg Decl., Exs. C, D, E.) He thus requested electronic service of any notices or documents that can be served by mail or other means. Plaintiff therefore must email defendants counsel every notice and paper that could be served by mail or fax. That does not preclude plaintiff from also serving papers by other means. Disposition Defendants Nelli Khlebnikova and Karolina Khlebnikovas motion to compel plaintiff Natalya Vydrug to testify and produce documents at her deposition is granted. Plaintiff Natalya Vydrug is ordered to appear at and testify at her deposition no later than September 20, 2024. Plaintiff Natalya Vydrug is ordered to produce all documents responsive to requests Nos. 1-28 at her deposition. No later than noon on August 30, plaintiff must offer three of the following dates for her deposition: September 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, or 20. Defendants may select any one of the three dates plaintiff offers. Plaintiff Natalya Vydrug and plaintiffs counsel D. Joshua Staub and James C. D. Carr are ordered to pay defendants $3,000 in sanctions within 7 days. Plaintiff, Staub, and Carr are jointly and severally liable for the sanctions.

Ruling

ANGELA TATE VS WOLFGANG PUCK ENTERPRISES, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL.

Case Number: 22STCV23934 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Dept: 29 The hearing is continued for approximately 14 days pending potential transfer.Moving party to give notice.

Ruling

MCCURDY, PAMELA vs LAZO, ISABEL MARIA, MD

Aug 27, 2024 |CV-23-000843

CV-23-000843 – MCCURDY, PAMELA vs LAZO, ISABEL MARIA, MD – Defendant, Matthew James Coates, MD’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication – GRANTED, unopposed.The Court finds that Defendants’ moving evidence – including the expert declaration of Dr. Hobarth Harris – establishes Defendant Mathew James Coates M.D. provided care toward Plaintiff during her admission to Memorial Medical Center on March 15, 2022, till her discharge which met the applicable standard of care expected of a gastroenterologist.The Court further finds that Defendant has established the absence of a triable issue of material fact regarding a crucial element of Plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim against Defendant. Notably, there is no factual dispute with regard to the issue of a breach of the applicable standard of care.Furthermore, in the absence of a breach of said standard of care, Plaintiff Ronald McCurdy’s claim for loss of consortium also fails. Therefore, Defendant Mathew James Coates M.D is entitled to entry of summary judgment in his favor herein. (Code of Civil Procedure §473 (c)).Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS judgment in favor of Defendant Mathew James Coates, M.D and against Plaintiffs in the instant matter.

Ruling

CECILIA FLORES VS CITY OF HAWTHORNE

Aug 27, 2024 |22TRCV01394

Case Number: 22TRCV01394 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Dept: P Motion for Summary Judgment The court considered the moving, opposition and reply papers. RULING Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. BACKGROUND On December 5, 2022, Plaintiff Cecilia Flores filed a complaint against Defendant City of Hawthorne, alleging a cause of action for dangerous condition of public property (Government Code section 835). The complaint alleges that on June 26, 2022, at the southeast corner of the intersection of El Segundo Boulevard and Manor Driver in the City of Hawthorne, Plaintiff tripped on a cracked, raised, damaged or uneven roadway, which was a dangerous condition. On May 29, 2024, Defendant filed this motion for summary judgment. On August 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On August 22, 2024, Defendant filed a reply. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS Plaintiffs Objections to Defendants Evidence · The following objections are OVERRULED: 2, 4 · The following objections are SUSTAINED: 1, lacks foundation; 3, legal conclusion. LEGAL AUTHORITY The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. (Id.) If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted. (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; Code Civ. Proc., §437c(c).) DISCUSSION Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) the T-shaped depression Plaintiff alleges she fell on is trivial as a matter of law, and therefore not a dangerous condition; (2) the T-shaped depression is an open and obvious condition and thus, there is no duty to warn or remedy the condition; (3) Defendant had no actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition; and (4) Plaintiff failed to substantially comply with the claim presentation requirements under the Government Claims Act because the location and condition of the dangerous condition have changed after filing the lawsuit. 1. Is the Alleged Dangerous of Property Condition a Trivial Defect? Government Code section 835 states: Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and either: (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. The term dangerous condition means a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used. (Gov. Code § 830(a).) A condition is not dangerous within the meaning of the statute unless it creates a hazard to those who foreseeably will use the property . . . with due care. Thus, even though it is foreseeable that persons may use public property without due care, a public entity may not be held liable for failing to take precautions to protect such persons. (Matthews v. City of Cerritos (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1384.) The condition of the property involved should create a substantial risk of injury, for an undue burden would be placed upon public entities if they were responsible for the repair of all conditions creating any possibility of injury however remote that possibility might be. (Fredette v. City of Long Beach (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 122, 130, fn.5.) The concept that a condition must be dangerous to be actionable is codified in Government Code section 830.2 as the trivial defect doctrine. Under that section, a condition is not a dangerous condition&if the&court, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, determines as a matter of law that the risk created by the condition was of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circ*mstances that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used. (Government Code section 830.2.) The trivial defect doctrine originated to shield public entities from liability where conditions on public property create a risk of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circ*mstances . . . no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used. (Huckey v. City of Temecula (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1104 (quoting Kasparian v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 11, 27).) The trivial defect doctrine is not an affirmative defense. (Id.) It is an aspect of duty that a plaintiff must plead and prove. (Id.) In appropriate cases, the trial court may determine . . . whether a given walkway defect was trivial as a matter of law. (Id.) Where reasonable minds can reach only one conclusionthat there was no substantial risk of injurythe issue is a question of law, properly resolved by way of summary judgment. (Id. at 1104-05 (quoting Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 922, 929).) If, however, the court determines that sufficient evidence has been presented so that reasonable minds may differ as to whether the defect presents a substantial risk of injury, the court may not conclude that the defect is trivial as a matter of law. (Id. at 1105.) In determining whether a given walkway defect is trivial as a matter of law, the court should not rely solely upon the size of the defectin this case, on the depth or height of the walkway depression or elevationalthough the defects size may be one of the most relevant factors to the courts decision. (Id. (quoting Fielder v. City of Glendale (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 719, 734) (emphasis in original).) The court should consider other circ*mstances which might have rendered the defect a dangerous condition at the time of the accident. (Id.) These other circ*mstances or factors include whether there were any broken pieces or jagged edges in the area of the defect, whether any dirt, debris or other material obscured a pedestrians view of the defect, the plaintiffs knowledge of the area, whether the accident occurred at night or in an unlighted area, the weather at the time of the accident, and whether the defect has caused any other accidents. (Id.) In sum, [a] court should decide whether a defect may be dangerous only after considering all of the circ*mstances surrounding the accident that might make the defect more dangerous than its size alone would suggest. (Id. (quoting Caloroso, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at 927) (alteration in original).) In making that determination, the court must undertake two essential steps: First, the court reviews evidence regarding type and size of the defect. If that preliminary analysis reveals a trivial defect, the court considers evidence of any additional factors [bearing on whether the defect presented a substantial risk of injury]. If these additional factors do not indicate the defect was sufficiently dangerous to a reasonably careful person, the court should deem the defect trivial as a matter of law. (Id.) Here, there is no dispute as to the defect in the roadway which Plaintiff asserts was unreasonably dangerous. It is depicted in the exhibits of both parties as a depression in the asphalt pavement of Manor Drive approximately ten feet from the west curbline of Manor drive and almost immediately adjacent to El Segundo Boulevard. (UMF 15.) The depression is roughly shaped like a T and is approximately 103 inches in length and varies between 20 and 30 1⁄2 inches wide. (Blanchette Dec. ¶ 7; Solomon Dec. ¶ 6.) The parties also agree that the maximum depth of the depression is approximately 1 3/8 inch. (UMF 15; PUMF 3.) Plaintiffs exhibits suggest that there is not a sharp drop off between the surrounding pavement and the defect; rather, the exhibits suggest that the depression is shallower at the edges than at the center. (Decl. Meissner, Exh. 6.) All of the photographs suggest that the depression is a different color from the surrounding pavement, a fact noticeable even from the satellite data used by Google Maps. (Decl. Meissner, Exh. 4.) Taken together, the court finds that, as to the first step in the analysis, that the defect is trivial as a matter of law. In reaching this conclusion, the court notes that a depression is different in kind from a lifted section of concrete. The evidence shows that depression is scalloped rather than sharp and human experience suggests that a depression is less of a tripping hazard than a raised piece of concrete. To be sure, the height differential posed some risk of injury&[b]ut to constitute a dangerous condition, the height differential, and the area surrounding it, must have posed a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used. (Huckey, supra, 37 Cal. App. 5th at 110910.) The next step in the courts analysis is to determine whether there are any other conditions which, even though the defect is trivial, would make the defect dangerous. [A]dditional factors courts typically consider in assessing a sidewalk condition's triviality as a matter of law are: the nature and quality of the defect (including whether it has jagged breaks or cracks); whether anything was obstructing or concealing the defect (for instance, an object, debris, or other substance); the lighting and weather conditions at the time of the incident; whether the defect has caused other accidents; and plaintiff's familiarity with the area. (Stack v. City of Lemoore (2023) 91 Cal. App. 5th 102, 115.) In support of the motion, Defendant presented evidence that Plaintiff would cross the same crosswalk at the subject intersection 4 to 5 times a week. (UMF 11.) (But see Stack, supra, 91 Cal. App. 5th at 119-120 (familiarity with the dangerous condition does not make it less dangerous.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the condition was not open and obvious. Plaintiffs expert opines that although T-shaped trench has an offset of 1 3/8 inches, it is not readily apparent to pedestrians that the T-shaped trench is depressed at all, let alone by almost an inch and a half, which (AMF No. 18, Solomon Decl., 9; Exh. 3.) The depth of the T shaped trench is made inconspicuous to pedestrians because of its similar shade of asphalt to the surrounding crosswalk. (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiff presents evidence that the City employees who went out to inspect the area after having been alerted of this incident by a proper government claim having been filed, testified that not even he initially noticed that the T-shaped trench was lower than the surrounding asphalt. (AMF No., 18, Krause Depo., 22: 19-21.) After reviewing the photographs and evidence submitted, the Court finds that, insofar as the distinction in color of the depression did not make the trivial defect any more dangerous, the condition was open and obvious. As to the other assertions made by Plaintiff, regarding sunlight and shadows as well as the oil, dirt and other debris on the ground there is no evidence of such factors. (Solomon Dec. ¶ 9.) Indeed, each of the photographs submitted by both sides show a depression in the middle of the roadway which is differently colored from the surrounding pavement and unobstructed in any way. Therefore, the court finds that there are no additional factors which increased the dangerousness of the asphalt defect. Based on the foregoing, Defendants motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. As the court finds that the defect in the pavement is trivial as a matter of law and that issue is dispositive for the Motion for Summary Judgment, the court declines to address the other issues raised by defendant. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of ruling.

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