U.S. Supreme Court
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 4Wheat. 316 316 (1819)McCulloch v. Maryland17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)316ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OFTHE STATE OF MARYLANDSyllabusCongress has power to incorporate a bankThe Act of the 10th of April, 1816, ch. 44, to "incorporate thesubscribers to the Bank of the United States" is a law made inpursuance of the Constitution.The Government of the Union, though limited in its powers, issupreme within its sphere of action, and its laws, when made inpursuance of the Constitution, form the supreme law of theland.There is nothing in the Constitution of the United Statessimilar to the Articles of Confederation, which exclude incidentalor implied powers.If the end be legitimate, and within the scope of theConstitution, all the means which are appropriate, which areplainly adapted to that end, and which are not prohibited, mayconstitutionally be employed to carry it into effect.The power of establishing a corporation is not a distinctsovereign power or end of Government, but only the means ofcarrying into effect other powers which are sovereign. Whenever itbecomes an appropriate means of exercising any of the powers givenby the Constitution to the Government of the Union, it may beexercised by that Government.If a certain means to carry into effect of any of the powersexpressly given by the Constitution to the Government of the Unionbe an appropriate measure, not prohibited by the Constitution, thedegree of its necessity is a question of legislative discretion,not of judicial cognizance.The Bank of the United States has, constitutionally, a right toestablish its branches or offices of discount and deposit withinany state.The State within which such branch may be established cannot,without violating the Constitution, tax that branch.The State governments have no right to tax any of theconstitutional means employed by the Government of the Union toexecute its constitutional powers.The States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard,impede, burthen, or in any manner control the operations of theconstitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into effect thepowers vested in the national Government.This principle does not extend to a tax paid by the realproperty of the Bank of the United States in common with the otherreal property in a particular state, nor to a tax imposed on theproprietary interest which the citizens of that State may hold inthis institution, in common with other property of the samedescription throughout the State.This was an action of debt, brought by the defendant in error,John James, who sued as well for himself as for the State ofMaryland, in the County Court of Baltimore County, in the saidState, against the plaintiff in error, McCulloch, to recovercertain penalties, under the act of the Legislature of Marylandhereafter mentioned. Judgment being rendered against the plaintiffin error, upon the following statement of facts agreed andsubmitted to the court by the parties, was affirmed by the Court ofAppeals of the State of Maryland, the highest court of law of saidState, and the cause was brought by writ of error to thisCourt.It is admitted by the parties in this cause, by their counsel,that there was passed, on the 10th day of April, 1816, by theCongress of the United States, an act entitled, "an act toincorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States;" andthat there was passed on the 11th day of February, 1818, by theGeneral Assembly of Maryland, an act, entitled, "an act to impose atax on all banks, or branches thereof, in the State of Maryland,not chartered by the legislature,"Page 17 U. S. 318which said acts are made part of this Statement, and it isagreed, may be read from the statute books in which they arerespectively printed. It is further admitted that the President,directors and company of the Bank of the United States,incorporated by the act of Congress aforesaid, did organizethemselves, and go into full operation, in the City ofPhiladelphia, in the State of Pennsylvania, in pursuance of thesaid act, and that they did on the ___ day of _____ 1817, establisha branch of the said bank, or an office of discount and deposit, inthe City of Baltimore, in the State of Maryland, which has, fromthat time until the first day of May 1818, ever since transactedand carried on business as a bank, or office of discount anddeposit, and as a branch of the said Bank of the United States, byissuing bank notes and discounting promissory notes, and performingother operations usual and customary for banks to do and perform,under the authority and by the direction of the said President,directors and company of the Bank of the United States, establishedat Philadelphia as aforesaid. It is further admitted that the saidPresident, directors and company of the said bank had no authorityto establish the said branch, or office of discount and deposit, atthe City of Baltimore, from the State of Maryland, otherwise thanthe said State having adopted the Constitution of the United Statesand composing one of the States of the Union. It is furtheradmitted that James William McCulloch, the defendant below, beingthe cashier of the said branch, or office of discount andPage 17 U. S. 319deposit did, on the several days set forth in the declaration inthis cause, issue the said respective bank notes therein described,from the said branch or office, to a certain George Williams, inthe City of Baltimore, in part payment of a promissory note of thesaid Williams, discounted by the said branch or office, which saidrespective bank notes were not, nor was either of them, so issuedon stamped paper in the manner prescribed by the act of assemblyaforesaid. It is further admitted that the said President,directors and company of the Bank of the United States, and thesaid branch, or office of discount and deposit have not, nor haseither of them, paid in advance, or otherwise, the sum of $15,000,to the Treasurer of the Western Shore, for the use of the State ofMaryland, before the issuing of the said notes, or any of them, norsince those periods. And it is further admitted that the Treasurerof the Western Shore of Maryland, under the direction of theGovernor and Council of the said State, was ready, and offered todeliver to the said President, directors and company of the saidbank, and to the said branch, or office of discount and deposit,stamped paper of the kind and denomination required and describedin the said act of assembly.The question submitted to the Court for their decision in thiscase is as to the validity of the said act of the General Assemblyof Maryland on the ground of its being repugnant to theConstitution of the United States and the act of Congressaforesaid, or to one of them. Upon the foregoing statement of factsand the pleadings in this cause (all errors inPage 17 U. S. 320which are hereby agreed to be mutually released), if the Courtshould be of opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover,then judgment, it is agreed, shall be entered for the plaintiffsfor $2,500 and costs of suit. B ut if the Court should be ofopinion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover upon thestatement and pleadings aforesaid, then judgment of nonpros shall be entered, with costs to the defendant.It is agreed that either party may appeal from the decision ofthe County Court to the Court of Appeals, and from the decision ofthe Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States,according to the modes and usages of law, and have the same benefitof this statement of facts in the same manner as could be had if ajury had been sworn and impanneled in this cause and a specialverdict had been found, or these facts had appeared and been statedin an exception taken to the opinion of the Court, and the Court'sdirection to the jury thereon.Copy of the act of the Legislature of the State of Maryland,referred to in the preceding Statement."An act to impose a tax on all banks or branchesthereof, in the""State of Maryland not chartered by thelegislature""Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland that if anybank has established or shall, without authority from the Statefirst had and obtained establish any branch, office of discountandPage 17 U. S. 321deposit, or office of pay and receipt in any part of this State,it shall not be lawful for the said branch, office of discount anddeposit, or office of pay and receipt to issue notes, in anymanner, of any other denomination than five, ten, twenty, fifty,one hundred, five hundred and one thousand dollars, and no noteshall be issued except upon stamped paper of the followingdenominations; that is to say, every five dollar note shall be upona stamp of ten cents; every ten dollar note, upon a stamp of twentycents; every twenty dollar note, upon a stamp of thirty cents;every fifty dollar note, upon a stamp of fifty cents; every onehundred dollar note, upon a stamp of one dollar; every five hundreddollar note, upon a stamp of ten dollars; and every thousand dollarnote, upon a stamp of twenty dollars; which paper shall befurnished by the Treasurer of the Western Shore, under thedirection of the Governor and Council, to be paid for upondelivery; provided always that any institution of the abovedescription may relieve itself from the operation of the provisionsaforesaid by paying annually, in advance, to the Treasurer of theWestern Shore, for the use of State, the sum of $15,000.""And be it enacted that the President, cashier, each of thedirectors and officers of every institution established or to beestablished as aforesaid, offending against the provisionsaforesaid shall forfeit a sum of $500 for each and every offence,and every person having any agency in circulating any noteaforesaid, not stamped as aforesaid directed, shall forfeit a sumnot exceeding $100,Page 17 U. S. 322every penalty aforesaid to be recovered by indictment or actionof debt in the county court of the county where the offence shallbe committed, one-half to the informer and the other half to theuse of the State.""And be it enacted that this act shall be in full force andeffect from and after the first day of May next. "Page 17 U. S. 400MARSHALL, Chief Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court.In the case now to be determined, the defendant, a sovereignState, denies the obligation of a law enacted by the legislature ofthe Union, and the plaintiff, on his part, contests the validity ofan act which has been passed by the legislature of that State. TheConstitution of our country, in its most interesting and vitalparts, is to be considered, the conflicting powers of theGovernment of the Union and of its members, as marked in thatConstitution, are to be discussed, and an opinion given which mayessentially influence the great operations of the Government. Notribunal can approach such a question without a deep sense of itsimportance, and of the awful responsibility involved in itsdecision. But it must be decided peacefully, or remain a sourceofPage 17 U. S. 401hostile legislation, perhaps, of hostility of a still moreserious nature; and if it is to be so decided, by this tribunalalone can the decision be made. On the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates has the Constitution of our country devolved this importantduty.The first question made in the cause is -- has Congress power toincorporate a bank?It has been truly said that this can scarcely be considered asan open question entirely unprejudiced by the former proceedings ofthe Nation respecting it. The principle now contested wasintroduced at a very early period of our history, has beenrecognised by many successive legislatures, and has been acted uponby the Judicial Department, in cases of peculiar delicacy, as a lawof undoubted obligation.It will not be denied that a bold and daring usurpation might beresisted after an acquiescence still longer and more complete thanthis. But it is conceived that a doubtful question, one on whichhuman reason may pause and the human judgment be suspended, in thedecision of which the great principles of liberty are notconcerned, but the respective powers of those who are equally therepresentatives of the people, are to be adjusted, if not put atrest by the practice of the Government, ought to receive aconsiderable impression from that practice. An exposition of theConstitution, deliberately established by legislative acts, on thefaith of which an immense property has been advanced, ought not tobe lightly disregarded.The power now contested was exercised by the first Congresselected under the present Constitution.Page 17 U. S. 402The bill for incorporating the Bank of the United States did notsteal upon an unsuspecting legislature and pass unobserved. Itsprinciple was completely understood, and was opposed with equalzeal and ability. After being resisted first in the fair and openfield of debate, and afterwards in the executive cabinet, with asmuch persevering talent as any measure has ever experienced, andbeing supported by arguments which convinced minds as pure and asintelligent as this country can boast, it became a law. Theoriginal act was permitted to expire, but a short experience of theembarrassments to which the refusal to revive it exposed theGovernment convinced those who were most prejudiced against themeasure of its necessity, and induced the passage of the presentlaw. It would require no ordinary share of intrepidity to assertthat a measure adopted under these circ*mstances was a bold andplain usurpation to which the Constitution gave no countenance.These observations belong to the cause; but they are not made underthe impression that, were the question entirely new, the law wouldbe found irreconcilable with the Constitution.In discussing this question, the counsel for the State ofMaryland have deemed it of some importance, in the construction ofthe Constitution, to consider that instrument not as emanating fromthe people, but as the act of sovereign and independent States. Thepowers of the General Government, it has been said, are delegatedby the States, who alone are truly sovereign, and must be exercisedin subordination to the States, who alone possess supremedominion.Page 17 U. S. 403It would be difficult to sustain this proposition. Theconvention which framed the Constitution was indeed elected by theState legislatures. But the instrument, when it came from theirhands, was a mere proposal, without obligation or pretensions toit. It was reported to the then existing Congress of the UnitedStates with a request that it might"be submitted to a convention of delegates, chosen in each Stateby the people thereof, under the recommendation of its legislature,for their assent and ratification."This mode of proceeding was adopted, and by the convention, byCongress, and by the State legislatures, the instrument wassubmitted to the people. They acted upon it in the only manner inwhich they can act safely, effectively and wisely, on such asubject -- by assembling in convention. It is true, they assembledin their several States -- and where else should they haveassembled? No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think ofbreaking down the lines which separate the States, and ofcompounding the American people into one common mass. Ofconsequence, when they act, they act in their States. But themeasures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be themeasures of the people themselves, or become the measures of theState governments.From these conventions the Constitution derives its wholeauthority. The government proceeds directly from the people; is"ordained and established" in the name of the people, and isdeclared to be ordained,"in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice,insure domestic tranquillity, and securePage 17 U. S. 404the blessings of liberty to themselves and to theirposterity."The assent of the States in their sovereign capacity is impliedin calling a convention, and thus submitting that instrument to thepeople. But the people were at perfect liberty to accept or rejectit, and their act was final. It required not the affirmance, andcould not be negatived, by the State Governments. The Constitution,when thus adopted, was of complete obligation, and bound the Statesovereignties.It has been said that the people had already surrendered alltheir powers to the State sovereignties, and had nothing more togive. But surely the question whether they may resume and modifythe powers granted to Government does not remain to be settled inthis country. Much more might the legitimacy of the GeneralGovernment be doubted had it been created by the States. The powersdelegated to the State sovereignties were to be exercised bythemselves, not by a distinct and independent sovereignty createdby themselves. To the formation of a league such as was theConfederation, the State sovereignties were certainly competent.But when, "in order to form a more perfect union," it was deemednecessary to change this alliance into an effective Government,possessing great and sovereign powers and acting directly on thepeople, the necessity of referring it to the people, and ofderiving its powers directly from them, was felt and acknowledgedby all. The Government of the Union then (whatever may be theinfluence of this fact on the case) is,Page 17 U. S. 405emphatically and truly, a Government of the people. In form andin substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted bythem, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for theirbenefit.This Government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumeratedpowers. The principle that it can exercise only the powers grantedto it would seem too apparent to have required to be enforced byall those arguments which its enlightened friends, while it wasdepending before the people, found it necessary to urge; thatprinciple is now universally admitted. But the question respectingthe extent of the powers actually granted is perpetually arising,and will probably continue to arise so long as our system shallexist. In discussing these questions, the conflicting powers of theGeneral and State Governments must be brought into view, and thesupremacy of their respective laws, when they are in opposition,must be settled.If any one proposition could command the universal assent ofmankind, we might expect it would be this -- that the Government ofthe Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within itssphere of action. This would seem to result necessarily from itsnature. It is the Government of all; its powers are delegated byall; it represents all, and acts for all. Though any one State maybe willing to control its operations, no State is willing to allowothers to control them. The nation, on those subjects on which itcan act, must necessarily bind its component parts. But thisquestion is not left to mere reason; the people have, in expressterms, decided it by saying,Page 17 U. S. 406"this Constitution, and the laws of the United States, whichshall be made in pursuance thereof," "shall be the supreme law ofthe land," and by requiring that the members of the Statelegislatures and the officers of the executive and judicialdepartments of the States shall take the oath of fidelity to it.The Government of the United States, then, though limited in itspowers, is supreme, and its laws, when made in pursuance of theConstitution, form the supreme law of the land, "anything in theConstitution or laws of any State to the contrarynotwithstanding."Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that of establishinga bank or creating a corporation. But there is no phrase in theinstrument which, like the Articles of Confederation, excludesincidental or implied powers and which requires that everythinggranted shall be expressly and minutely described. Even the 10thAmendment, which was framed for the purpose of quieting theexcessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word"expressly," and declares only that the powers "not delegated tothe United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved tothe States or to the people," thus leaving the question whether theparticular power which may become the subject of contest has beendelegated to the one Government, or prohibited to the other, todepend on a fair construction of the whole instrument. The men whodrew and adopted this amendment had experienced the embarrassmentsresulting from the insertion of this word in the ArticlesPage 17 U. S. 407of Confederation, and probably omitted it to avoid thoseembarrassments. A Constitution, to contain an accurate detail ofall the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and ofall the means by which they may be carried into execution, wouldpartake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely beembraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understoodby the public. Its nature, therefore, requires that only its greatoutlines should be marked, its important objects designated, andthe minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced fromthe nature of the objects themselves. That this idea wasentertained by the framers of the American Constitution is not onlyto be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from thelanguage. Why else were some of the limitations found in the 9thsection of the 1st article introduced? It is also in some degreewarranted by their having omitted to use any restrictive term whichmight prevent its receiving a fair and just interpretation. Inconsidering this question, then, we must never forget that it isa Constitution we are expounding.Although, among the enumerated powers of Government, we do notfind the word "bank" or "incorporation," we find the great powers,to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; todeclare and conduct a war; and to raise and support armies andnavies. The sword and the purse, all the external relations, and noinconsiderable portion of the industry of the nation are intrustedto its Government. It can never be pretendedPage 17 U. S. 408that these vast powers draw after them others of inferiorimportance merely because they are inferior. Such an idea can neverbe advanced. But it may with great reason be contended that aGovernment intrusted with such ample powers, on the due executionof which the happiness and prosperity of the Nation so vitallydepends, must also be intrusted with ample means for theirexecution. The power being given, it is the interest of the Nationto facilitate its execution. It can never be their interest, andcannot be presumed to have been their intention, to clog andembarrass its execution by withholding the most appropriate means.Throughout this vast republic, from the St. Croix to the Gulf ofMexico, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, revenue is to becollected and expended, armies are to be marched and supported. Theexigencies of the Nation may require that the treasure raised inthe north should be transported to the south that raised in theeast, conveyed to the west, or that this order should be reversed.Is that construction of the Constitution to be preferred whichwould render these operations difficult, hazardous and expensive?Can we adopt that construction (unless the words imperiouslyrequire it) which would impute to the framers of that instrument,when granting these powers for the public good, the intention ofimpeding their exercise, by withholding a choice of means? If,indeed, such be the mandate of the Constitution, we have only toobey; but that instrument does not profess to enumerate the meansby which the powers it confers may be executed; nor does itprohibit the creation of a corporation,Page 17 U. S. 409if the existence of such a being be essential, to the beneficialexercise of those powers. It is, then, the subject of fair inquiryhow far such means may be employed.It is not denied that the powers given to the Government implythe ordinary means of execution. That, for example, of raisingrevenue and applying it to national purposes is admitted to implythe power of conveying money from place to place as the exigenciesof the Nation may require, and of employing the usual means ofconveyance. But it is denied that the Government has its choice ofmeans, or that it may employ the most convenient means if, toemploy them, it be necessary to erect a corporation. On whatfoundation does this argument rest? O n this alone: the power ofcreating a corporation is one appertaining to sovereignty, and isnot expressly conferred on Congress. This is true. But alllegislative powers appertain to sovereignty. The original power ofgiving the law on any subject whatever is a sovereign power, and ifthe Government of the Union is restrained from creating acorporation as a means for performing its functions, on the singlereason that the creation of a corporation is an act of sovereignty,if the sufficiency of this reason be acknowledged, there would besome difficulty in sustaining the authority of Congress to passother laws for the accomplishment of the same objects. TheGovernment which has a right to do an act and has imposed on it theduty of performing that act must, according to the dictates ofreason, be allowedPage 17 U. S. 410to select the means, and those who contend that it may notselect any appropriate means that one particular mode of effectingthe object is excepted take upon themselves the burden ofestablishing that exception.The creation of a corporation, it is said, appertains tosovereignty. This is admitted. But to what portion of sovereigntydoes it appertain? Does it belong to one more than to another? InAmerica, the powers of sovereignty are divided between theGovernment of the Union and those of the States. They are eachsovereign with respect to the objects committed to it, and neithersovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other. Wecannot comprehend that train of reasoning, which would maintainthat the extent of power granted by the people is to be ascertainednot by the nature and terms of the grant, but by its date. SomeState Constitutions were formed before, some since, that of theUnited States. We cannot believe that their relation to each otheris in any degree dependent upon this circ*mstance. Their respectivepowers must, we think, be precisely the same as if they had beenformed at the same time. Had they been formed at the same time, andhad the people conferred on the General Government the powercontained in the Constitution, and on the States the whole residuumof power, would it have been asserted that the Government of theUnion was not sovereign, with respect to those objects which wereintrusted to it, in relation to which its laws were declared to besupreme? If this could not have been asserted, we cannot wellcomprehend the process of reasoningPage 17 U. S. 411which maintains that a power appertaining to sovereignty cannotbe connected with that vast portion of it which is granted to theGeneral Government, so far as it is calculated to subserve thelegitimate objects of that Government. The power of creating acorporation, though appertaining to sovereignty, is not, like thepower of making war or levying taxes or of regulating commerce, agreat substantive and independent power which cannot be implied asincidental to other powers or used as a means of executing them. Itis never the end for which other powers are exercised, but a meansby which other objects are accomplished. No contributions are madeto charity for the sake of an incorporation, but a corporation iscreated to administer the charity; no seminary of learning isinstituted in order to be incorporated, but the corporate characteris conferred to subserve the purposes of education. No city wasever built with the sole object of being incorporated, but isincorporated as affording the best means of being well governed.The power of creating a corporation is never used for its own sake,but for the purpose of effecting something else. No sufficientreason is therefore perceived why it may not pass as incidental tothose powers which are expressly given if it be a direct mode ofexecuting them.But the Constitution of the United States has not left the rightof Congress to employ the necessary means for the execution of thepowers conferred on the Government to general reasoning. To itsenumeration of powers is added that of making"allPage 17 U. S. 412laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying intoexecution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by thisConstitution in the Government of the United States or in anydepartment thereof."The counsel for the State of Maryland have urged variousarguments to prove that this clause, though in terms a grant ofpower, is not so in effect, but is really restrictive of thegeneral right which might otherwise be implied of selecting meansfor executing the enumerated powers. In support of thisproposition, they have found it necessary to contend that thisclause was inserted for the purpose of conferring on Congress thepower of making laws. That, without it, doubts might be entertainedwhether Congress could exercise its powers in the form oflegislation.But could this be the object for which it was inserted? AGovernment is created by the people having legislative, executiveand judicial powers. Its legislative powers are vested in aCongress, which is to consist of a senate and house ofrepresentatives. Each house may determine the rule of itsproceedings, and it is declared that every bill which shall havepassed both houses shall, before it becomes a law, be presented tothe President of the United States. The 7th section describes thecourse of proceedings by which a bill shall become a law, and thenthe 8th section enumerates the powers of Congress. Could it benecessary to say that a legislature should exercise legislativepowers, in the shape of legislation? After allowing each house toprescribePage 17 U. S. 413its own course of proceeding, after describing the manner inwhich a bill should become a law, would it have entered into themind of a single member of the convention that an express power tomake laws was necessary to enable the legislature to make them?That a legislature, endowed with legislative powers, can legislateis a proposition too self-evident to have been questioned.But the argument on which most reliance is placed is drawn fromthat peculiar language of this clause. Congress is not empowered byit to make all laws which may have relation to the powers conferredon the Government, but such only as may be "necessary and proper"for carrying them into execution. The word "necessary" isconsidered as controlling the whole sentence, and as limiting theright to pass laws for the execution of the granted powers to suchas are indispensable, and without which the power would benugatory. That it excludes the choice of means, and leaves toCongress in each case that only which is most direct andsimple.Is it true that this is the sense in which the word "necessary"is always used? Does it always import an absolute physicalnecessity so strong that one thing to which another may be termednecessary cannot exist without that other? We think it does not. Ifreference be had to its use in the common affairs of the world orin approved authors, we find that it frequently imports no morethan that one thing is convenient, or useful, or essential toanother. To employ the means necessary to an end is generallyunderstood as employing any means calculated toPage 17 U. S. 414produce the end, and not as being confined to those single meanswithout which the end would be entirely unattainable. Such is thecharacter of human language that no word conveys to the mind in allsituations one single definite idea, and nothing is more commonthan to use words in a figurative sense. Almost all compositionscontain words which, taken in a their rigorous sense, would conveya meaning different from that which is obviously intended. It isessential to just construction that many words which importsomething excessive should be understood in a more mitigated sense-- in that sense which common usage justifies. The word "necessary"is of this description. It has not a fixed character peculiar toitself. It admits of all degrees of comparison, and is oftenconnected with other words which increase or diminish theimpression the mind receives of the urgency it imports. A thing maybe necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensablynecessary. To no mind would the same idea be conveyed by theseseveral phrases. The comment on the word is well illustrated by thepassage cited at the bar from the 10th section of the 1st articleof the Constitution. It is, we think, impossible to compare thesentence which prohibits a State from laying "imposts, or duties onimports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary forexecuting its inspection laws," with that which authorizes Congress"to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carryinginto execution" the powers of the General Government withoutfeeling a conviction that the convention understood itself tochange materiallyPage 17 U. S. 415the meaning of the word "necessary," by prefixing the word"absolutely." This word, then, like others, is used in varioussenses, and, in its construction, the subject, the context, theintention of the person using them are all to be taken intoview.Let this be done in the case under consideration. The subject isthe execution of those great powers on which the welfare of aNation essentially depends. It must have been the intention ofthose who gave these powers to insure, so far as human prudencecould insure, their beneficial execution. This could not be done byconfiding the choice of means to such narrow limits as not to leaveit in the power of Congress to adopt any which might beappropriate, and which were conducive to the end. This provision ismade in a Constitution intended to endure for ages to come, andconsequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.To have prescribed the means by which Government should, in allfuture time, execute its powers would have been to change entirelythe character of the instrument and give it the properties of alegal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide byimmutable rules for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must havebeen seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.To have declared that the best means shall not be used, but thosealone without which the power given would be nugatory, would havebeen to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself ofexperience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate itslegislation to circ*mstances.Page 17 U. S. 416If we apply this principle of construction to any of the powersof the Government, we shall find it so pernicious in its operationthat we shall be compelled to discard it. The powers vested inCongress may certainly be carried into execution, withoutprescribing an oath of office. The power to exact this security forthe faithful performance of duty is not given, nor is itindispensably necessary. The different departments may beestablished; taxes may be imposed and collected; armies and naviesmay be raised and maintained; and money may be borrowed, withoutrequiring an oath of office. It might be argued with as muchplausibility as other incidental powers have been assailed that theconvention was not unmindful of this subject. The oath which mightbe exacted -- that of fidelity to the Constitution -- isprescribed, and no other can be required. Yet he would be chargedwith insanity who should contend that the legislature might notsuperadd to the oath directed by the Constitution such other oathof office as its wisdom might suggest.So, with respect to the whole penal code of the United States,whence arises the power to punish in cases not prescribed by theConstitution? All admit that the Government may legitimately punishany violation of its laws, and yet this is not among the enumeratedpowers of Congress. The right to enforce the observance of law bypunishing its infraction might be denied with the more plausibilitybecause it is expressly given in some cases.Congress is empowered "to provide for the punishmentPage 17 U. S. 417of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the UnitedStates," and "to define and punish piracies and felonies committedon the high seas, and offences against the law of nations." Theseveral powers of Congress may exist in a very imperfect State, tobe sure, but they may exist and be carried into execution, althoughno punishment should be inflicted, in cases where the right topunish is not expressly given.Take, for example, the power "to establish post-offices andpost-roads." This power is executed by the single act of making theestablishment. But from this has been inferred the power and dutyof carrying the mail along the post road from one post office toanother. And from this implied power has again been inferred theright to punish those who steal letters from the post office, orrob the mail. It may be said with some plausibility that the rightto carry the mail, and to punish those who rob it, is notindispensably necessary to the establishment of a post office andpost road. This right is indeed essential to the beneficialexercise of the power, but not indispensably necessary to itsexistence. So, of the punishment of the crimes of stealing orfalsifying a record or process of a Court of the United States, orof perjury in such Court. To punish these offences is certainlyconducive to the due administration of justice. But Courts mayexist, and may decide the causes brought before them, though suchcrimes escape punishment.The baneful influence of this narrow construction on all theoperations of the Government, and the absolutePage 17 U. S. 418impracticability of maintaining it without rendering theGovernment incompetent to its great objects, might be illustratedby numerous examples drawn from the Constitution and from our laws.The good sense of the public has pronounced without hesitation thatthe power of punishment appertains to sovereignty, and may beexercised, whenever the sovereign has a right to act, as incidentalto his Constitutional powers. It is a means for carrying intoexecution all sovereign powers, and may be used although notindispensably necessary. It is a right incidental to the power, andconducive to its beneficial exercise.If this limited construction of the word "necessary" must beabandoned in order to punish, whence is derived the rule whichwould reinstate it when the Government would carry its powers intoexecution by means not vindictive in their nature? If the word"necessary" means "needful," "requisite," "essential," "conduciveto," in order to let in the power of punishment for the infractionof law, why is it not equally comprehensive when required toauthorize the use of means which facilitate the execution of thepowers of Government, without the infliction of punishment?In ascertaining the sense in which the word "necessary" is usedin this clause of the Constitution, we may derive some aid fromthat with which it it is associated. Congress shall have power "tomake all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry intoexecution" the powers of the Government. If the word "necessary"was used in that strict and rigorous sense for which the counselfor the State ofPage 17 U. S. 419Maryland contend, it would be an extraordinary departure fromthe usual course of the human mind, as exhibited in composition, toadd a word the only possible effect of which is to qualify thatstrict and rigorous meaning, to present to the mind the idea ofsome choice of means of legislation not strained and compressedwithin the narrow limits for which gentlemen contend.But the argument which most conclusively demonstrates the errorof the construction contended for by the counsel for the State ofMaryland is founded on the intention of the convention asmanifested in the whole clause. To waste time and argument inproving that, without it, Congress might carry its powers intoexecution would be not much less idle than to hold a lighted taperto the sun. As little can it be required to prove that, in theabsence of this clause, Congress would have some choice of means.That it might employ those which, in its judgment, would mostadvantageously effect the object to be accomplished. That any meansadapted to the end, any means which tended directly to theexecution of the Constitutional powers of the Government, were inthemselves Constitutional. This clause, as construed by the Stateof Maryland, would abridge, and almost annihilate, this useful andnecessary right of the legislature to select its means. That thiscould not be intended is, we should think, had it not been alreadycontroverted, too apparent for controversy.We think so for the following reasons:1st. The clause is placed among the powers of Congress, notamong the limitations on those powers.Page 17 U. S. 4202d. Its terms purport to enlarge, not to diminish, the powersvested in the Government. It purports to be an additional power,not a restriction on those already granted. No reason has been orcan be assigned for thus concealing an intention to narrow thediscretion of the National Legislature under words which purport toenlarge it. The framers of the Constitution wished its adoption,and well knew that it would be endangered by its strength, not byits weakness. Had they been capable of using language which wouldconvey to the eye one idea and, after deep reflection, impress onthe mind another, they would rather have disguised the grant ofpower than its limitation. If, then, their intention had been, bythis clause, to restrain the free use of means which mightotherwise have been implied, that intention would have beeninserted in another place, and would have been expressed in termsresembling these. "In carrying into execution the foregoing powers,and all others," &c., "no laws shall be passed but such as arenecessary and proper." Had the intention been to make this clauserestrictive, it would unquestionably have been so in form, as wellas in effect.The result of the most careful and attentive considerationbestowed upon this clause is that, if it does not enlarge, itcannot be construed to restrain, the powers of Congress, or toimpair the right of the legislature to exercise its best judgmentin the selection of measures to carry into execution theConstitutional powers of the Government. If no other motive for itsinsertion can be suggested, a sufficient one is found in the desireto remove all doubts respectingPage 17 U. S. 421the right to legislate on that vast mass of incidental powerswhich must be involved in the Constitution if that instrument benot a splendid bauble.We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the Governmentare limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But wethink the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to thenational legislature that discretion with respect to the means bywhich the powers it confers are to be carried into execution whichwill enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it inthe manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end belegitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and allmeans which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit ofthe Constitution, are Constitutional. *That a corporation must be considered as a means not less usual,not of higher dignity, not more requiring a particularspecification than other means has been sufficiently proved. If welook to the origin of corporations, to the manner in which theyhave been framed in that Government from which we have derived mostof our legal principles and ideas, or to the uses to which theyhave been applied, we find no reason to suppose that aConstitution, omitting, and wisely omitting, to enumerate all themeans for carrying into execution the great powers vested inGovernment, ought to have specified this. Had it been intended togrant this power as one which should be distinct and independent,to be exercised in any case whatever, itPage 17 U. S. 422would have found a place among the enumerated powers of theGovernment. But being considered merely as a means, to be employedonly for the purpose of carrying into execution the given powers,there could be no motive for particularly mentioning it.The propriety of this remark would seem to be generallyacknowledged by the universal acquiescence in the constructionwhich has been uniformly put on the 3d section of the 4th articleof the Constitution. The power to "make all needful rules andregulations respecting the territory or other property belonging tothe United States" is not more comprehensive than the power "tomake all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying intoexecution" the powers of the Government. Yet all admit theconstitutionality of a Territorial Government, which is a corporatebody.If a corporation may be employed, indiscriminately with othermeans, to carry into execution the powers of the Government, noparticular reason can be assigned for excluding the use of a bank,if required for its fiscal operations. To use one must be withinthe discretion of Congress if it be an appropriate mode ofexecuting the powers of Government. That it is a convenient, auseful, and essential instrument in the prosecution of its fiscaloperations is not now a subject of controversy. All those who havebeen concerned in the administration of our finances have concurredin representing its importance and necessity, and so strongly havethey been felt that Statesmen of the first class, whose previousopinionsPage 17 U. S. 423against it had been confirmed by every circ*mstance which canfix the human judgment, have yielded those opinions to theexigencies of the nation. Under the Confederation, Congress,justifying the measure by its necessity, transcended, perhaps, itspowers to obtain the advantage of a bank; and our own legislationattests the universal conviction of the utility of this measure.The time has passed away when it can be necessary to enter into anydiscussion in order to prove the importance of this instrument as ameans to effect the legitimate objects of the Government.But were its necessity less apparent, none can deny its being anappropriate measure; and if it is, the decree of its necessity, ashas been very justly observed, is to be discussed in another place.Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measureswhich are prohibited by the Constitution, or should Congress, underthe pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for theaccomplishment of objects not intrusted to the Government, it wouldbecome the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiringsuch a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not thelaw of the land. But where the law is not prohibited, and is reallycalculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to theGovernment, to undertake here to inquire into the decree of itsnecessity would be to pass the line which circ*mscribes thejudicial department and to tread on legislative ground. This Courtdisclaims all pretensions to such a power.Page 17 U. S. 424After this declaration, it can scarcely be necessary to say thatthe existence of State banks can have no possible influence on thequestion. No trace is to be found in the Constitution of anintention to create a dependence of the Government of the Union onthose of the States, for the execution of the great powers assignedto it. Its means are adequate to its ends, and on those means alonewas it expected to rely for the accomplishment of its ends. Toimpose on it the necessity of resorting to means which it cannotcontrol, which another Government may furnish or withhold, wouldrender its course precarious, the result of its measures uncertain,and create a dependence on other Governments which might disappointit* most important designs, and is incompatible with the languageof the Constitution. But were it otherwise, the choice of meansimplies a right to choose a national bank in preference to Statebanks, and Congress alone can make the election.After the most deliberate consideration, it is the unanimous anddecided opinion of this Court that the act to incorporate the Bankof the United States is a law made in pursuance of theConstitution, and is a part of the supreme law of the land.The branches, proceeding from the same stock and being conduciveto the complete accomplishment of the object, are equallyconstitutional. It would have been unwise to locate them in thecharter, and it would be unnecessarily inconvenient to employ thelegislative power in making those subordinate arrangements. Thegreat duties of the bank are prescribed; those duties requirebranches; and the bank itselfPage 17 U. S. 425may, we think, be safely trusted with the selection of placeswhere those branches shall be fixed, reserving always to theGovernment the right to require that a branch shall be locatedwhere it may be deemed necessary.It being the opinion of the Court that the act incorporating thebank is constitutional, and that the power of establishing a branchin the State of Maryland might be properly exercised by the bankitself, we proceed to inquire:2. Whether the State of Maryland may, without violating theConstitution, tax that branch?That the power of taxation is one of vital importance; that itis retained by the States; that it is not abridged by the grant ofa similar power to the Government of the Union; that it is to beconcurrently exercised by the two Governments -- are truths whichhave never been denied. But such is the paramount character of theConstitution that its capacity to withdraw any subject from theaction of even this power is admitted. The States are expresslyforbidden to lay any duties on imports or exports except what maybe absolutely necessary for executing their inspection laws. If theobligation of this prohibition must be conceded -- if it mayrestrain a State from the exercise of its taxing power on importsand exports -- the same paramount character would seem to restrain,as it certainly may restrain, a State from such other exercise ofthis power as is in its nature incompatible with, and repugnant to,the constitutional laws of the Union. A law absolutely repugnant toanother as entirelyPage 17 U. S. 426repeals that other as if express terms of repeal were used.On this ground, the counsel for the bank place its claim to beexempted from the power of a State to tax its operations. There isno express provision for the case, but the claim has been sustainedon a principle which so entirely pervades the Constitution, is sointermixed with the materials which compose it, so interwoven withits web, so blended with its texture, as to be incapable of beingseparated from it without rending it into shreds.This great principle is that the Constitution and the laws madein pursuance thereof are supreme; that they control theConstitution and laws of the respective States, and cannot becontrolled by them. From this, which may be almost termed an axiom,other propositions are deduced as corollaries, on the truth orerror of which, and on their application to this case, the causehas been supposed to depend. These are, 1st. That a power to createimplies a power to preserve; 2d. That a power to destroy, ifwielded by a different hand, is hostile to, and incompatible withthese powers to create and to preserve; 3d. That, where thisrepugnancy exists, that authority which is supreme must control,not yield to that over which it is supreme.These propositions, as abstract truths, would perhaps never becontroverted. Their application to this case, however, has beendenied, and both in maintaining the affirmative and the negative, asplendor of eloquence, and strength of argument seldom if eversurpassed have been displayed.Page 17 U. S. 427The power of Congress to create and, of course, to continue thebank was the subject of the preceding part of this opinion, and isno longer to be considered as questionable.That the power of taxing it by the States may be exercised so asto destroy it is too obvious to be denied. But taxation is said tobe an absolute power which acknowledges no other limits than thoseexpressly prescribed in the Constitution, and, like sovereign powerof every other description, is intrusted to the discretion of thosewho use it. But the very terms of this argument admit that thesovereignty of the State, in the article of taxation itself, issubordinate to, and may be controlled by, the Constitution of theUnited States. How far it has been controlled by that instrumentmust be a question of construction. In making this construction, noprinciple, not declared, can be admissible which would defeat thelegitimate operations of a supreme Government. It is of the veryessence of supremacy to remove all obstacles to its action withinits own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in subordinategovernments as to exempt its own operations from their owninfluence. This effect need not be stated in terms. It is soinvolved in the declaration of supremacy, so necessarily implied init, that the expression of it could not make it more certain. Wemust, therefore, keep it in view while construing theConstitution.The argument on the part of the State of Maryland is not thatthe States may directly resist a law of Congress, but that they mayexercise theirPage 17 U. S. 428acknowledged powers upon it, and that the Constitution leavesthem this right, in the confidence that they will not abuse it.Before we proceed to examine this argument and to subject it totest of the Constitution, we must be permitted to bestow a fewconsiderations on the nature and extent of this original right oftaxation, which is acknowledged to remain with the States. It isadmitted that the power of taxing the people and their property isessential to the very existence of Government, and may belegitimately exercised on the objects to which it is applicable, tothe utmost extent to which the Government may choose to carry it.The only security against the abuse of this power is found in thestructure of the Government itself. In imposing a tax, thelegislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, asufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.The people of a State, therefore, give to their Government aright of taxing themselves and their property, and as theexigencies of Government cannot be limited, they prescribe nolimits to the exercise of this right, resting confidently on theinterest of the legislator and on the influence of the constituentover their representative to guard them against its abuse. But themeans employed by the Government of the Union have no suchsecurity, nor is the right of a State to tax them sustained by thesame theory. Those means are not given by the people of aparticular State, not given by the constituents of the legislaturewhich claim the right to tax them, but by the people of all theStates They are given by all,Page 17 U. S. 429for the benefit of all -- and, upon theory, should be subjectedto that Government only which belongs to all.It may be objected to this definition that the power of taxationis not confined to the people and property of a State. It may beexercised upon every object brought within its jurisdiction.This is true. But to what source do we trace this right? It isobvious that it is an incident of sovereignty, and is coextensivewith that to which it is an incident. All subjects over which thesovereign power of a State extends are objects of taxation, butthose over which it does not extend are, upon the soundestprinciples, exempt from taxation. This proposition may almost bepronounced self-evident.The sovereignty of a State extends to everything which exists byits own authority or is introduced by its permission, but does itextend to those means which are employed by Congress to carry intoexecution powers conferred on that body by the people of the UnitedStates? We think it demonstrable that it does not. Those powers arenot given by the people of a single State. They are given by thepeople of the United States, to a Government whose laws, made inpursuance of the Constitution, are declared to be supreme.Consequently, the people of a single State cannot confer asovereignty which will extend over them.If we measure the power of taxation residing in a State by theextent of sovereignty which the people of a single State possessand can confer on its Government, we have an intelligible standard,applicablePage 17 U. S. 430to every case to which the power may be applied. We have aprinciple which leaves the power of taxing the people and propertyof a State unimpaired; which leaves to a State the command of allits resources, and which places beyond its reach all those powerswhich are conferred by the people of the United States on theGovernment of the Union, and all those means which are given forthe purpose of carrying those powers into execution. We have aprinciple which is safe for the States and safe for the Union. Weare relieved, as we ought to be, from clashing sovereignty; frominterfering powers; from a repugnancy between a right in oneGovernment to pull down what there is an acknowledged right inanother to build up; from the incompatibility of a right in oneGovernment to destroy what there is a right in another to preserve.We are not driven to the perplexing inquiry, so unfit for thejudicial department, what degree of taxation is the legitimate useand what degree may amount to the abuse of the power. The attemptto use it on the means employed by the Government of the Union, inpursuance of the Constitution, is itself an abuse because it is theusurpation of a power which the people of a single State cannotgive.We find, then, on just theory, a total failure of this originalright to tax the means employed by the Government of the Union, forthe execution of its powers. The right never existed, and thequestion whether it has been surrendered cannot arise.But, waiving this theory for the present, let us resume theinquiry, whether this power can be exercisedPage 17 U. S. 431by the respective States, consistently with a fair constructionof the Constitution?That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that thepower to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create;that there is a plain repugnance in conferring on one Government apower to control the constitutional measures of another, whichother, with respect to those very measures, is declared to besupreme over that which exerts the control, are propositions not tobe denied. But all inconsistencies are to be reconciled by themagic of the word CONFIDENCE. Taxation, it is said, does notnecessarily and unavoidably destroy. To carry it to the excess ofdestruction would be an abuse, to presume which would banish thatconfidence which is essential to all Government.But is this a case of confidence? Would the people of any oneState trust those of another with a power to control the mostinsignificant operations of their State Government? We know theywould not. Why, then, should we suppose that the people of any oneState should be willing to trust those of another with a power tocontrol the operations of a Government to which they have confidedtheir most important and most valuable interests? In theLegislature of the Union alone are all represented. The Legislatureof the Union alone, therefore, can be trusted by the people withthe power of controlling measures which concern all, in theconfidence that it will not be abused. This, then, is not a case ofconfidence, and we must consider it is as it really is.Page 17 U. S. 432If we apply the principle for which the State of Marylandcontends, to the Constitution generally, we shall find it capableof changing totally the character of that instrument. We shall findit capable of arresting all the measures of the Government, and ofprostrating it at the foot of the States. The American people havedeclared their Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereofto be supreme, but this principle would transfer the supremacy, infact, to the States.If the States may tax one instrument, employed by the Governmentin the execution of its powers, they may tax any and every otherinstrument. They may tax the mail; they may tax the mint; they maytax patent rights; they may tax the papers of the custom house;they may tax judicial process; they may tax all the means employedby the Government to an excess which would defeat all the ends ofGovernment. This was not intended by the American people. They didnot design to make their Government dependent on the States.Gentlemen say they do not claim the right to extend Statetaxation to these objects. They limit their pretensions toproperty. But on what principle is this distinction made? Those whomake it have furnished no reason for it, and the principle forwhich they contend denies it. They contend that the power oftaxation has no other limit than is found in the 10th section ofthe 1st article of the Constitution; that, with respect toeverything else, the power of the States is supreme, and admits ofno control. If this be true, the distinction between propertyandPage 17 U. S. 433other subjects to which the power of taxation is applicable ismerely arbitrary, and can never be sustained. This is not all. Ifthe controlling power of the States be established, if theirsupremacy as to taxation be acknowledged, what is to restrain theirexercising control in any shape they may please to give it? Theirsovereignty is not confined to taxation; that is not the only modein which it might be displayed. The question is, in truth, aquestion of supremacy, and if the right of the States to tax themeans employed by the General Government be conceded, thedeclaration that the Constitution and the laws made in pursuancethereof shall be the supreme law of the land is empty and unmeaningdeclamation.In the course of the argument, the Federalist has been quoted,and the opinions expressed by the authors of that work have beenjustly supposed to be entitled to great respect in expounding theConstitution. No tribute can be paid to them which exceeds theirmerit; but in applying their opinions to the cases which may arisein the progress of our Government, a right to judge of theircorrectness must be retained; and to understand the argument, wemust examine the proposition it maintains and the objectionsagainst which it is directed. The subject of those numbers fromwhich passages have been cited is the unlimited power of taxationwhich is vested in the General Government. The objection to thisunlimited power, which the argument seeks to remove, is stated withfulness and clearness. It is"that an indefinite power of taxation in the latter (theGovernmentPage 17 U. S. 434of the Union) might, and probably would, in time, deprive theformer (the Government of the States) of the means of providing fortheir own necessities, and would subject them entirely to the mercyof the National Legislature. As the laws of the Union are to becomethe supreme law of the land; as it is to have power to pass alllaws that may be necessary for carrying into execution theauthorities with which it is proposed to vest it; the NationalGovernment might, at any time, abolish the taxes imposed for Stateobjects upon the pretence of an interference with its own. It mightallege a necessity for doing this, in order to give efficacy to thenational revenues; and thus, all the resources of taxation might,by degrees, become the subjects of federal monopoly, to the entireexclusion and destruction of the State Governments."The objections to the Constitution which are noticed in thesenumbers were to the undefined power of the Government to tax, notto the incidental privilege of exempting its own measures fromState taxation. The consequences apprehended from this undefinedpower were that it would absorb all the objects of taxation, "tothe exclusion and destruction of the State Governments." Thearguments of the Federalist are intended to prove the fallacy ofthese apprehensions, not to prove that the Government was incapableof executing any of its powers without exposing the means itemployed to the embarrassments of State taxation. Arguments urgedagainst these objections and these apprehensions are to beunderstood as relating to the points theyPage 17 U. S. 435mean to prove. Had the authors of those excellent essays beenasked whether they contended for that construction of theConstitution which would place within the reach of the States thosemeasures which the Government might adopt for the execution of itspowers, no man who has read their instructive pages will hesitateto admit that their answer must have been in the negative.It has also been insisted that, as the power of taxation in theGeneral and State Governments is acknowledged to be concurrent,every argument which would sustain the right of the GeneralGovernment to tax banks chartered by the States, will equallysustain the right of the States to tax banks chartered by theGeneral Government.But the two cases are not on the same reason. The people of allthe States have created the General Government, and have conferredupon it the general power of taxation. The people of all theStates, and the States themselves, are represented in Congress,and, by their representatives, exercise this power. When they taxthe chartered institutions of the States, they tax theirconstituents, and these taxes must be uniform. But when a Statetaxes the operations of the Government of the United States, itacts upon institutions created not by their own constituents, butby people over whom they claim no control. It acts upon themeasures of a Government created by others as well as themselves,for the benefit of others in common with themselves. The differenceis that which always exists, and always must exist, between theaction of the whole on aPage 17 U. S. 436part, and the action of a part on the whole -- between the lawsof a Government declared to be supreme, and those of a Governmentwhich, when in opposition to those laws, is not supreme.But if the full application of this argument could be admitted,it might bring into question the right of Congress to tax the Statebanks, and could not prove the rights of the States to tax the Bankof the United States.The Court has bestowed on this subject its most deliberateconsideration. The result is a conviction that the States have nopower, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or inany manner control the operations of the constitutional lawsenacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested inthe General Government. This is, we think, the unavoidableconsequence of that supremacy which the Constitution hasdeclared.We are unanimously of opinion that the law passed by theLegislature of Maryland, imposing a tax on the Bank of the UnitedStates is unconstitutional and void.This opinion does not deprive the States of any resources whichthey originally possessed. It does not extend to a tax paid by thereal property of the bank, in common with the other real propertywithin the State, nor to a tax imposed on the interest which thecitizens of Maryland may hold in this institution, in common withother property of the same description throughout the State. Butthis is a tax on the operations of the bank, and is, consequently,a tax on the operation of an instrument employed by theGovernmentPage 17 U. S. 437of the Union to carry its powers into execution. Such a tax mustbe unconstitutional.JUDGMENT. This cause came on to be heard, on the transcript ofthe record of the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland, andwas argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is the opinionof this Court that the act of the Legislature of Maryland iscontrary to the Constitution of the United States, and void, andtherefore that the said Court of Appeals of the State of Marylanderred, in affirming the judgment of the Baltimore County Court, inwhich judgment was rendered against James W. McCulloch; but thatthe said Court of Appeals of Maryland ought to have reversed thesaid judgment of the said Baltimore County Court, and ought to havegiven judgment for the said appellant, McCulloch. It is, therefore,adjudged and ordered that the said judgment of the said Court ofAppeals of the State of Maryland in this case be, and the samehereby is, reversed and annulled. And this Court, proceeding torender such judgment as the said Court of Appeals should haverendered, it is further adjudged and ordered that the judgment ofthe said Baltimore County Court be reversed and annulled, and thatjudgment be entered in the said Baltimore County Court for the saidJames W. McCulloch.* See Montague v. Richardson, 24 Conn. 348.
