A map showing shake intensity of the quake.
A map showing shake intensity of the quake.
A map showing shake intensity of the quake.
The tiny, inexpensive FPV (first-person view) drone has proved to be one of the most potent weapons in this war, where conventional warplanes are relatively rare because of a dense concentration of anti-aircraft systems near front lines. FPVs - originally designed for civilian racers - are controlled by pilots on the ground and often crashed into targets, laden with explosives.
The total cost of the drone’s components, including an explosive warhead secured with cable ties, can be as little as $500 or less.
The FPV drones take off from improvised platforms several kilometres from the front line. Depending on their size, battery and payload, range varies from 5 km to 20 km or more.
A soldier operates the drone using a remote controller and a headset that allows them to see the view from the camera. Meanwhile, another soldier looks at a tablet computer with maps and gives directions.
After flying across the front line, the pilot spots the target: a tank. They will select one of its most vulnerable parts - an open hatch, the engine or ammunition stored in the turret.
Usually, the target will already have been detected by a reconnaissance drone and the FPV would zip straight to its location and fly at high speed into the target.
Every day, drone units from both armies publish videos on social media demonstrating how drones as inexpensive as $500 can effectively destroy costly artillery pieces or tanks worth millions of dollars, and showcasing their transformative role in modern warfare.
Drones have been used in warfare for decades – pilotless, radio-controlled aircraft were tested as far back as World War One. But the war in Ukraine has seen an explosion in the scale with which they're deployed. They have transformed from performing specialized functions to becoming one of the most important and widely used weapons on the battlefield.
The deployment of smaller drones, which was inconsistent at the beginning of the war, has now become extremely organised, with UAVs now integrated into Ukraine's armed forces structure. Almost every fighting brigade has an assault drone company, while most units have small reconnaissance drones.
Many brigades in both armies have specialized drone units for surveillance, artillery spotting, FPV drones, and precision bombing.
The Ukrainian government aims to make a million FPV drones in 2024. To put that into context, it's around double the number of artillery shells supplied by the entire European Union over the past year.
The process of deploying this technology on the battlefield begins with reconnaissance drones equipped with high-spec cameras that transmit real-time video back to their pilot's control screen, allowing the operator to look for enemy targets from above.
Reconnaissance drone units locate enemy targets with surveillance drones of various types and ranges.
Reconnaissance drones come in various shapes and sizes. The most popular is the Chinese-made DJI Mavic, a quadcopter used by civilians all over the world to film landscapes or events like weddings. These drones, which can cost about $1,500 to $3,000 each, are used by soldiers in trenches to survey the battlefield.
Meanwhile, specialist crews further back from the frontline fly larger, often winged reconnaissance drones equipped with cameras that cost thousands of dollars. These craft can fly and see much further into enemy territory.
When targets are spotted, their coordinates are relayed to commanders through secure messengers and entered into Kropyva, a digital map containing aggregated data on Russian targets.
Commanders then determine the best method to strike a particular target. Ukraine has more limited resources than its Russian adversary, so tough decisions often have to be made to conserve scarce munitions.
Because FPV drones are guided to their target, they are far more accurate than most artillery. This allows them to chase and hit moving vehicles which would otherwise have been able to evade shells. However, traditional shells can still deliver a much stronger explosive punch than drones' smaller warheads.
Depending on the target, the commanders decide to use artillery or drones to hit the target. Artillery can deliver a much bigger explosion, but drones are better at hitting moving targets.
Soldiers have learned to fear the overhead, as this often indicates they have either been spotted or are about to be attacked.
The increased use of drones in the war has forced heavy machinery such as tanks to move several kilometres further back from the front line, according to Ukrainian soldiers. Infantrymen, meanwhile, cite FPVs and drones that drop munitions as their biggest threat and say there are now so many in the air that it's difficult to move to and from trenches or reinforce dugouts.
A 3d render graphic showing different types of munitions.
In a long and large conflict, cost is key: the fewer resources used to destroy a target, the better.
FPV drones, as well as their bomb-dropping cousins, hold some significant advantages over most other types of weaponry: An FPV drone can cost less than one artillery shell, and is more accurate.
Drone technology is nonetheless most effective when used in conjunction with other types of weaponry. Even FPV drone pilots who have racked up dozens of hits on enemy targets say they would be almost powerless without infantry and artillery to hold the front line.
Long-range attacks
Drones are not just used on the battlefield: both Ukraine and Russia have hit targets hundreds of kilometres away from the front lines using long-range UAVs.
This map illustrates Ukrainian and Russian drone attacks within Ukraine and Russia, contextualizing the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Additionally, it depicts long-range drone attacks targeting Russian oil infrastructure.
These long-range drones often hit factories making weapons, military bases or energy facilities deep inside enemy territory.
This graphic showcases a range of drones employed in attacks during the Ukrainian war, including the Bayraktar TB2, Shahed 136, Bober, Orlan-10, Lancet-3, Mavic, UJ-22, and FPV drones.
The widespread use of long-range attack drones began in the autumn of 2022, several months into the war, when Russia bought hundreds of Shahed drones from Iran and began to fly them into Ukrainian targets. They immediately proved to be extremely effective, costing less even than the air defence missiles Ukraine initially used to down them.
The Shahed follows a pre-programmed path. That journey will often include as many twists and turns as possible to confuse and exhaust Ukraine's air defences, which is one of the drone's primary functions for the Russians.
The Shahed-136, the most commonly used model, has been estimated to cost $100,000 or less, and Russia has built its own facilities to produce it. The delta-wing design of the Shahed-136 gives it a low radar signature. Combined with its ability to travel at low-altitude, this makes detection by radar difficult.
The Shahed-136, the most commonly used model, is estimated to cost $100,000 or less, and Russia has built its own facilities to produce it. Ukraine has had to adapt, deploying flak cannons and machine guns atop pickup trucks to shoot them down.
At the same time, Ukraine has been developing its own drones to strike targets deep inside Russia as a way of making up for its own lack of long-range missiles.
Early incarnations of Ukrainian long-range drones were usually downed by Russian electronic warfare systems, but Ukraine's military appears to have learnt lessons from this and has been able to strike targets deep within Russia in recent months, including factories and oil refineries.
Ukraine has developed long-range drones featuring aerodynamic designs with extended wings and propulsion systems, allowing for increased range and endurance, supported by larger fuel tanks for extended flight capabilities. Ukraine has targeted energy infrastructure deep within Russian territory in strikes aimed at disrupting supply lines and logistics.
In late January, Russian energy firm Novatek was forced to suspend operations at its huge Ust-Luga fuel processing and shipping terminal for three days after a Ukrainian drone attack started a fire. Operations at the facility, key for the export of some hydrocarbons, appeared to be affected for several weeks.
Ukraine has also developed the UJ-22 drone, featuring a winged design that allows the aircraft to deliver precision bombing strikes on static targets within a range of 800 km.
Electronic warfare against drones
Electronic warfare (EW) systems have proved to be the most effective way of stopping drones. Both sides use EW systems to jam radio frequencies in certain areas. When a drone's signal is jammed, the pilot loses the ability to control the craft or can no longer see the video signal, depending on which frequency has been disrupted.
The most effective way to stop drones has proved to be Electronic Warfare (EW). Both sides use EW systems to jam radio frequencies in certain areas. When a drone’s signal is jammed by EW, it loses its connection with the pilot.
EW is becoming increasingly dense on the front lines, according to Ukrainian pilots. Most EW systems have a limited span of frequencies, so drone pilots have responded by switching to less commonly used ones. This leads to a technological game of cat and mouse on the front lines, as EW operators seek to disrupt drones flying on constantly-shifting frequencies.
Both sides also have to contend with electronic reconnaissance systems, which can trace drones’ signals back to enemy pilots, potentially identifying their location.
Pilots have responded to this by increasing their use of signal repeaters, which act as an intermediary station for the connection between craft and pilot. Repeaters can be deployed on the ground or attached to another drone and flown in the air, increasing signal range and obscuring the pilots' positions.
While large, truck-mounted EW systems are used to protect expensive equipment, infantry units have started using smaller systems to protect their trenches - though the effectiveness of the less powerful ones can be patchy.
At infantry level, smaller EW devices and "drone guns" are used to jam incoming UAVs.
Serhiy, a Ukrainian infantry platoon commander from the 59th Brigade fighting in the east of the country, said his unit's homemade EW system, as well as their portable EW devices or "drone guns", had become less effective due to Russian UAVs changing frequencies. He declined to give his full name as Ukrainian soldiers are told not to divulge their identities for their safety.
Next-generation drones with AI
In response to the increasing challenges posed by EW systems, both Ukraine and Russia are racing to develop drones guided by artificial intelligence. These drones identify and lock onto their targets without the need for communication with their pilot, making them impervious to signal jamming.
This graphic explains how more advanced drones can use Artificial Intelligence to identify and lock onto targets. The drone is able to identify and lock onto a target using an onboard AI system, after which it can guide itself into its target without the pilot's input.
AI target identification is already being used by both sides in a small number of drones.
"You cannot jam such a drone, because there is nothing to jam," said a 20-year-old Ukrainian drone pilot from the 92nd brigade who goes by his call sign Darwin.Ukrainian drone industry figures say the technology still needs to be developed further before it can be widely used.
Nevertheless, many manufacturers, politicians and pilots say they believe AI systems could be at the heart of drone warfare in the future. Some predict that EW protection could become so widely used as to render most conventional FPV drones useless.
Videos of FPV drone attacks
The videos have been verified by Eleanor Whalley, of Reuters' Visual Verification team. They were sourced from Telegram channels or provided by various drone units of the Ukrainian Army (including the Azov Brigade in Kremina, the 110th Mechanised Brigade in Lastochkyne and Avdiivka, and the State Border Service of Ukraine in Vodyane and Hryanykivka).
Videos of the drone unit and additional work by
Inna Varenytsia
Sources
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI); ACLED: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (Drone attacks from Feb. 24, 2022, to March 12, 2024); Institute for the Study of War with American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project (Russian-occupied territory data as of 3 p.m. EST, March 12); Council on Foreign Relations; CSET: Center for Security and Emerging Technology.
Edited by
Mike Collett-White, Simon Scarr and Pravin Char
